In this second paper, I return to Ms. Gage and her classroom, but here, I apply the theories of Foucault and Butler as I grapple with understanding (in a rather discursive and ongoing way) how regulatory practices of schooling serve to produce certain ways of knowing which are in tension with the critical approaches to teaching that Ms. Gage, and other teachers like her, attempt to bring to their students. Although I had initially intended to use Foucault’s Discipline and Punish (1977) alone in working through my questions, I find myself returning to Butler’s Gender Trouble (1990/1999/2006) again and again as a way to bring agency into the workings, or technologies, of power, something which I find particularly difficult to pin down in Foucault’s work. At the same time, I move forward with some caution here because I always want to challenge myself as a researcher, writer, and thinker to remain both critical and optimistic when it comes to individual and collective agency. Foucault writes in The Archaeology of Knowledge (1972), “I have not denied—far from it—the possibility of changing discourse: I have deprived the sovereignty of the subject of the exclusive and instantaneous right to it” (p. 209). I am reminded by these words that agency is slippery and easily misidentified in fields of power. Yet, Butler does attempt to locate agency in her text, although she too, troubles the location of it all the while. And so in writing about Foucault and Butler together, I am better able to locate my own notions of agency and subversion in the field of literacy and identity – although those locations are likely to shift as I write even this.
As I was preparing for writing this paper, I did some searching through files from another class where I read Foucault’s Archeology of Knowledge as part of a small group project. In doing so, I came across an email to one of my group members questioning how Foucault’s regulatory rules of formation, something he writes about in Discipline and Punish as well, fit with Freire’s notion of consciousness (conscienization) and naming the world in order to change it? In other words, if, as Foucault writes, we can never be outside the discourses of power, can we ever truly practice liberatory education in the way Freire and critical scholars who follow his work suggest? How are we to create new practices and transform our realities? Are Foucault and Freire incompatible?
These questions, then, brought me to the example of Ms. Gage and her classroom as well. Ms. Gage, as I’ve written about in my first paper, lives and breathes a critical approach to teaching, even though she may never name it as such. Her entire curriculum and way of being in her classroom challenge her students to critique and question both word and world through analysis of media representations. More importantly, she then moves her students to the production of their own critical representations in film and image. Instead of being passive consumers of their worlds, they become creators of meaning within them. This is not, however, without its difficulties for reasons onto which Foucault sheds some light.
Power
Foucault traces the history of punishment and discipline as it shifts from a focus on prisoners’ bodies to their souls. Alarming as it may be, the transfer of Foucault’s argument about prisons to schools is not a difficult one to make. We readily observe the disciplining of bodies into regulated times and spaces within schools, and more importantly, we witness the instantiation of that discipline on the very souls of our students as we label them, in often subtle ways, as either good or bad, normal or abnormal within the available discourses of schooling and education. When students fail to fit a particular model of the good or bad student, power, in its ever economic fashion, merely shifts the definition of the “crime” of nonconformity to fit the behaviors and dispositions of individuals and continue to mark the gaps between them. Even more, students place the regulations and rules of identity onto themselves and each other in such a way that the classification of our students happens quite readily and efficiently among and within them. Such is the capillary function of relational power; it moves everywhere, subtly and economically.
Within the capillary functions of power, what effect, in the sense of production, do such techniques have on the role of the teacher as well? From my own experience in the classroom and through my observations of Ms. Gage, it is clear to me that teaching critically and innovatively is not without its consequences. The mark of a successful school, according to Foucault, is one that functions efficiently. The mark of a successful teacher, then, is one who does not disrupt the efficient movement of bodies in space. Does not the teacher who asks her students to critically examine the world commit crimes of that very disruption? And by asking her students to become critical and questioning consumers of their world and to participate in the disruption of discourses, does a teacher like Ms. Gage place her students at the peril of being gathered up by the mechanisms of power. In other words, does such disruption become defined as a crime, merely serving the very economy of power against which it pushes? Not only does Ms. Gage then become the “Other” of teachers who better fit the normative model of teaching, but her students become the “Other” of a normative model of learning.
My questions bring me, then, to the relationship between power and knowledge as well. For Foucault, at the heart of all mechanisms of power is the “truth-power relation” (p. 55). He writes that punishment, in any of its many forms, does not make use of the body any longer, but makes use of representation. In other words, regulation of ideas and representations is a more efficient way to control than regulating bodies – one follows the other. For Ms. Gage, her entire critical approach to instruction and analysis is to question representation and to ask her students to determine whose interests are served by various representations of ideas and people. In this way, she asks her students to uncover and critique ideology, but in doing so, she must give them a new language with which to even imagine and speak such things.
Foucault writes, “It is not simply at the level of consciousness, of representation and in what one thinks one knows, but at the level of what makes possible the knowledge that is transformed into political investment" (p. 185). Thus, regulatory and normative practices determine what is even knowable. In order to teach critically, a teacher like Ms. Gage places her students in a crisis of language and truth as they seek the words and ideas that push against the very frame in which they have been realizing their world. “Power produces;” Foucault continues, “it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production" (p. 194). Here, then, is the crux: Ms. Gage and her critical approach to teaching can still never exist outside the power that produces what is knowable. Indeed, by being in opposition to a notion of Truth (with a capital T), Ms. Gage still reinforces and produces that knowledge in opposition to her own way of viewing the world through multiple truths (lowercase t).
No wonder she stays up at night worrying that she may never move her students to change their worlds.
Agency
Foucault is difficult for me because as much as I try to find flaws in his argument, the more I live in this world, the more I think he is right. But like Ms. Gage, I won’t give up searching for a fissure in the workings of power, and here is where Butler helps.
Although she finds a foundation in the philosophy of Foucault, Butler takes up the question of political agency in a way that Foucault does not. In her discussion of the construction of gender, Butler contends that certain performances and rituals of the self become normative, while more incoherent performances, or subversions, merely serve to keep normative practices in tact (the “Other” against which the norm is once again defined). Moreover, she agrees that we can only express an ‘I’ through the language made available to us.
At the same time, however, Butler finds possibility in the “iterability of performativity,” and views this repetition with supplementation as “one that cannot disavow power as the condition of its own possibility” (p. xxv). What she seems to be saying here, is that there is possibility in the repetition of performances and in the possible supplement to or subtle shift in that repetition. Because there is movement, there is possibility. She does not dispute Foucault’s argument that power always produces within the same matrix of power, but she does raise the question of disruption within and through that same matrix. Tanetha brought us this example in class when she spoke about “using the master’s tools.” Butler, too, seems to believe, in her examples of gender ambiguity, that in its productive function, power may produce a different version of the repetition. She asks, “What kind of subversive repetition might call into question the regulatory practice of identity itself?” (p. 44). And although she does not necessarily answer such a question, she wonders if parody, hyperbole, dissonance, and confusion might not subvert in powerful ways.
In returning my thoughts to Ms. Gage, then, the production aspect of her class becomes critically important. The possibility for her students to create representations of their world through parody and dissonance, albeit always within the matrix of power and using the master’s tools, creates a small fissure for subversion to arise. Agency, for Butler, becomes a question of signification and resignification at work, and as Ms. Gage’s students resignify, a theory of agency is at work. It is the incompleteness of representation, the blip in the iteration, the et cetera, that opens the possible space for change.
And yet, Butler is not so naïve. She ends her book reminding us that all performances are not without their punitive consequences. She notes that we cannot go through the world feeling that our identities our unsuccessful or in constant subversion without great sacrifice and pain. “For an identity to be an effect means that it is neither fatally determined nor fully artificial and arbitrary” (p. 201). The construction of identities is not opposed to agency, she goes on, but “is a necessary scene of agency, the very terms in which agency is articulated and becomes culturally intelligible.” Agency, too, must be intelligible within fields of power.
So, I end in a similar place to where I started: still wondering about critical teaching pedagogies and their consequences on students and teachers. Foucault and Butler offer a mollified and optimistic view at the same time. I turn, then, to that copy of the email I found while planning to write this paper for a suitable answer to my question about the compatibility of Foucault and critical pedagogy. To my question, my friend and colleague answered this: “any attempt to make [students’] experiences more equitable and humanizing is far from trivial.” That sounds pretty good to me.
References
Butler, J. (1990/1999/2006). Gender trouble. New York: Routledge.
Foucault, M. (1972). The archaeology of knowledge. New York: Routledge.
Foucault, M. (1977). Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison. New York: Vintage Books.
Wednesday, November 26, 2008
Bulter -- Locating Subversion
I really do think that Foucault and Butler complement each other nicely, so here are some other notes I've been thinking about incorporating into my crazy late paper.
practices become normative -- performances and rituals of self
"Sometimes gender ambiguity can operate precisely to contain or deflect non-normative sexual practice and thereby work to keep normative sexuality intact" (p. xiv) -- I'm not thinking about sexuality here, but the ways in which the non-normative serves to render the normative all the more normal
"an expectation that ends up producing the very phenomenon that it anticipates" (p. xv)
subversion carrying market value
Butler focuses more than Foucault, I think, on political agency, but she certainly complicates it as well -- "The iterability of performativity is a theory of agency, one that cannot disavow power as the condition of its own possibility" (p. xxv) -- agency is never isolated from power
We can only express an "I" through the language available to us
Power produces the subjects that it then judges and represents -- Foucault -- this is really important in my thinking about innovative and risk-taking teachers
So ... Is there a teaching subject not constituted by the discourse of the discipline of school? Does that make sense?
"parading in the mode of otherness" (p. 17)
"Is 'unity' necessary for effective political action?" (p. 21)
Butler speaks in terms of gender, but can we use her thinking to understand the performance of any identity -- that the "incoherent" and "discontinuous" define the normative
there are multiple teaching identities, but always constituted by the "field of power" into which they are articulated
the perceived cause becomes its effect -- power produces
Butler asks a lot of questions, but doesn't answer them. Still, the questions are productive too: "What possibility exists for the disruption of the oppositional binary itself?" (p. 37)
Prohibition -- Lacanian theory
Can there be a subversive?
"Power, rather than the law, encompasses both the juridical (prohibitive and regulatory) and the productive (inadvertently generative) functions of differential relations" (p. 40) -- everything emerges in the matrix of power
Important question: "What kind of subversive repetition might call into question the regulatory practice of identity itself?" (p. 44) Do they become mere parodies of the original? And is that subversive? Hyperbole, dissonance, internal confusion, and proliferation (p. 43)
Confusion as a site for "intervention, exposure, and displacement of these reifications" (p. 43)
Becoming, then, is essential -- there is no origination or end
On Foucault -- bodies produce their own regulation (p. 183); the soul is present through its absence (huh?)
identity is a fabrication (p. 185)
"Hence, as a strategy of survival within compulsory systems, gender is a performance with clearly punitive consequences" (p. 190)
Agency is in the incompleteness, the possible "blip" in the iteration -- the supplement, the et cetera (p. 196)
Agency becomes a question of how signification and resignification work (p. 197)
"Indeed, to understand identity as a practice, and as a signifying practice, is to understand culturally intelligible subjects as the resulting effects of a rule-bound discourse that inserts itself in the pervasive and mundane signifying acts of linguistic life" (p. 199)
Parody -- a failed copy
"For an identity to be an effect means that it is neither fatally determined nor fully artificial and arbitrary" (p. 201). "Construction is not opposed to agency; it is necessary scene of agency, the very terms in which agency is articulated and becomes culturally intelligible."
The question is HOW to repeat and DISPLACE in local strategies
practices become normative -- performances and rituals of self
"Sometimes gender ambiguity can operate precisely to contain or deflect non-normative sexual practice and thereby work to keep normative sexuality intact" (p. xiv) -- I'm not thinking about sexuality here, but the ways in which the non-normative serves to render the normative all the more normal
"an expectation that ends up producing the very phenomenon that it anticipates" (p. xv)
subversion carrying market value
Butler focuses more than Foucault, I think, on political agency, but she certainly complicates it as well -- "The iterability of performativity is a theory of agency, one that cannot disavow power as the condition of its own possibility" (p. xxv) -- agency is never isolated from power
We can only express an "I" through the language available to us
Power produces the subjects that it then judges and represents -- Foucault -- this is really important in my thinking about innovative and risk-taking teachers
So ... Is there a teaching subject not constituted by the discourse of the discipline of school? Does that make sense?
"parading in the mode of otherness" (p. 17)
"Is 'unity' necessary for effective political action?" (p. 21)
Butler speaks in terms of gender, but can we use her thinking to understand the performance of any identity -- that the "incoherent" and "discontinuous" define the normative
there are multiple teaching identities, but always constituted by the "field of power" into which they are articulated
the perceived cause becomes its effect -- power produces
Butler asks a lot of questions, but doesn't answer them. Still, the questions are productive too: "What possibility exists for the disruption of the oppositional binary itself?" (p. 37)
Prohibition -- Lacanian theory
Can there be a subversive?
"Power, rather than the law, encompasses both the juridical (prohibitive and regulatory) and the productive (inadvertently generative) functions of differential relations" (p. 40) -- everything emerges in the matrix of power
Important question: "What kind of subversive repetition might call into question the regulatory practice of identity itself?" (p. 44) Do they become mere parodies of the original? And is that subversive? Hyperbole, dissonance, internal confusion, and proliferation (p. 43)
Confusion as a site for "intervention, exposure, and displacement of these reifications" (p. 43)
Becoming, then, is essential -- there is no origination or end
On Foucault -- bodies produce their own regulation (p. 183); the soul is present through its absence (huh?)
identity is a fabrication (p. 185)
"Hence, as a strategy of survival within compulsory systems, gender is a performance with clearly punitive consequences" (p. 190)
Agency is in the incompleteness, the possible "blip" in the iteration -- the supplement, the et cetera (p. 196)
Agency becomes a question of how signification and resignification work (p. 197)
"Indeed, to understand identity as a practice, and as a signifying practice, is to understand culturally intelligible subjects as the resulting effects of a rule-bound discourse that inserts itself in the pervasive and mundane signifying acts of linguistic life" (p. 199)
Parody -- a failed copy
"For an identity to be an effect means that it is neither fatally determined nor fully artificial and arbitrary" (p. 201). "Construction is not opposed to agency; it is necessary scene of agency, the very terms in which agency is articulated and becomes culturally intelligible."
The question is HOW to repeat and DISPLACE in local strategies
Monday, November 24, 2008
Still working on some paper ideas... yes, late
I've been doing some thinking on the disciplining of teacher bodies in schools and how innovation is, in many ways, prohibited. Foucault and Butler will both be useful in sorting this out, and I'm just now starting to gather some ideas and notes. Bear with me. . . not everything below will be useful.
modifying the definition of the crime (p. 33)
Technology and techniques of power
"Justice pursues the body beyond all possible pain" (p. 34)
Economy of power
"They must if possible judge and condemn themselves" (p. 38)
"...reducing to the minimum the work of investigation and the mechanics of demonstration, the confession was therefore highly valued" (p. 39)
"It is as if investigation and punishment had become mixed" (p. 41)
"Guilt did not begin when all the evidence was gathered together; piece by piece, it was constituted by each of the elements that made it possible to recognize a guilty person" (p. 42)
Public execution and the ceremony of it... (p. 47)
"the truth-power relation remains at the heart of all mechanisms of punishment..." (p. 55)
Shift to a more generalized punishment
"it was an effort to adjust the mechanisms of power that frame the everyday lives of individuals; an adaptation and a refinement of the machinery that assumes responsibility for and places under surveillance their everyday behaviour, their identity, their activity, their apparently unimportant gestures..." (p. 78)
"there was too much power in the hands of the judges who were able to content themselves with futile evidence, providing it was 'legal' evidence, and who were allowed too great a freedom in the choice of penalty" (p. 79)
"The reform was not prepared outside the legal machinery and against all its representatives; it was prepared, for the most part, from within..." (p. 81)
"insert the power to punish more deeply into the social body" (p. 82)
vagabondage (p. 88)
"The least crime attacks the whole of society" (p. 90)
"If effect the offence opposes an individual to the entire social body; in order to punish him, society has the right to oppose him in its entirety" (p. 90)
"One must take into account not the past offence, but the future disorder." (p. 93)
"One must punish exactly enough to prevent repetition. There is, then, a shift in the mechanics of example..." (p. 93)
"Punishment has to make use not of the body, but of representation" (p. 94)
"punishment is directed above all at others, at all the potentially guilty" (p. 108)
"learned economy of publicity" (p. 109)
"an inversion of the traditional discourse of the crime" (p. 112) -- shame upon the heads of the guilty -- punishment becomes a lesson
Part Three: Discipline
"infinitesimal power over the active body" (p. 137)
treating the body en masse -- control of bodies together in space; the object of control is not the behavior or the language of the body, "but the economy, the efficiency of movements, their internal organization" (p. 137)
disciplines as "general formulas of domination"
The art of distributions
1. Discipline sometimes requires enclosure
2. Disciplinary machinery works space in a flexible and detailed way
3. Functional sites code space
4. Rank matters -- the place one occupies in classification (p. 145)
"Discipline is an art of rank, a technique for the transformation of arrangements. It individualizes bodies by a location that does not give them a fixed position, but distributes them and circulates them in a network of relations" (p. 146)
The ideal: maximum speed and maximum efficiency (p. 154)
Disciplinary time (p. 159) imposed on pedagogical practice -- when exams must be given and when students must be at a particular stage
"the ultimate capacity of an individual" -- to be useful "according to the level in the series that they are moving through" (p. 160)
the macro- and a micro-physics of power
"Thus a new demand appears to which discipline must respond: to construct a machine whose effect will be maximized by the concerted articulation of the elementary parts of which it is composed. Discipline is no longer simply as art of distributing bodies, of extracting time from them and accumulating it, but of composing forces in order to obtain an efficient machine" (p. 164)
"The individual body becomes an element that may be placed, moved, articulated on others."
Individuality: cellular, organic, genetic, and combinatory (p. 167)
Creates 'tactics' -- "the art of constructing, with located bodies, coded activities and trained aptitudes, mechanisms in which the product of the various forces is increased by their calculated combination are no doubt the highest form of disciplinary practice" (p. 167)
The means of correct training
"Instead of bending all its subjects into a single uniform mass, it separates, analyses, differentiates, carries its procedures of decomposition to the point of necessary and sufficient single units" (p. 170) -- where is teacher collaboration?
"Discipline 'makes' individuals; it is the specific technique of a power that regards individuals as both objects and as instruments of its exercise" (p. 170)
Coerces by means of observation -- hierarchized surveillance
Who ends up in this particular classroom?
"Discipline makes possible the operation of a relational power that sustains itself by its own mechanism and which, for the spectacle of public events, subsitutes the uninterrupted play of calculated gazes" (p. 177) -- a subtle power
A double system: "gratification-punishment" (p. 180)
"the disciplinary apparatuses hierarchized the 'good' and the 'bad' subjects in relation to one another" (p. 181) "Through this micro-economy of a perpetual penality operates a differentiation that is not one of acts, but of individuals themselves, of their nature, their potentialities, their level or their value."
"This distribution according to ranks or grade has a double role: it marks the gaps, hierarchizes qualities, skills and aptitudes; but it also punishes and rewards" (p. 181)
"a constant pressure to conform" (p. 182)
the regime of disciplinary power: 5 operations (p. 182) -- "In short, it normalizes" (pp. 183-84)
"It is not simply at the level of consciousness, of representation and in what one thinks one knows, but at the level of what makes possible the knowledge that is transformed into political investment" (p. 185) Discipline makes determines what is even knowable -- the power/knowledge crux
Examination and discipline "fix" individuals into places (p. 189) -- "formalization of the individual within power relations" (p. 190)
The "case" (p. 191)
Normalizing through comparison -- normal and abnormal
KEY: "In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production" (p. 194)
Panopticism
"the penetration of regulation into the smallest details of everyday life" (p. 198) -- "capillary function of power"
useful wherever a "particular form of behavior must be imposed" (p. 205)
exercise of power supervised by society as a whole
discipline mechanism -- power moves rapidly and lightly -- "the design of a subtle coercion for a society to come" (p. 209)
"discipline fixes; it arrests or regulates movements; it clears up confusion; it dissipates compact groupings of individuals wandering about the country in unpredictable ways; it establishes calculated distributions" (p. 219)
modifying the definition of the crime (p. 33)
Technology and techniques of power
"Justice pursues the body beyond all possible pain" (p. 34)
Economy of power
"They must if possible judge and condemn themselves" (p. 38)
"...reducing to the minimum the work of investigation and the mechanics of demonstration, the confession was therefore highly valued" (p. 39)
"It is as if investigation and punishment had become mixed" (p. 41)
"Guilt did not begin when all the evidence was gathered together; piece by piece, it was constituted by each of the elements that made it possible to recognize a guilty person" (p. 42)
Public execution and the ceremony of it... (p. 47)
"the truth-power relation remains at the heart of all mechanisms of punishment..." (p. 55)
Shift to a more generalized punishment
"it was an effort to adjust the mechanisms of power that frame the everyday lives of individuals; an adaptation and a refinement of the machinery that assumes responsibility for and places under surveillance their everyday behaviour, their identity, their activity, their apparently unimportant gestures..." (p. 78)
"there was too much power in the hands of the judges who were able to content themselves with futile evidence, providing it was 'legal' evidence, and who were allowed too great a freedom in the choice of penalty" (p. 79)
"The reform was not prepared outside the legal machinery and against all its representatives; it was prepared, for the most part, from within..." (p. 81)
"insert the power to punish more deeply into the social body" (p. 82)
vagabondage (p. 88)
"The least crime attacks the whole of society" (p. 90)
"If effect the offence opposes an individual to the entire social body; in order to punish him, society has the right to oppose him in its entirety" (p. 90)
"One must take into account not the past offence, but the future disorder." (p. 93)
"One must punish exactly enough to prevent repetition. There is, then, a shift in the mechanics of example..." (p. 93)
"Punishment has to make use not of the body, but of representation" (p. 94)
"punishment is directed above all at others, at all the potentially guilty" (p. 108)
"learned economy of publicity" (p. 109)
"an inversion of the traditional discourse of the crime" (p. 112) -- shame upon the heads of the guilty -- punishment becomes a lesson
Part Three: Discipline
"infinitesimal power over the active body" (p. 137)
treating the body en masse -- control of bodies together in space; the object of control is not the behavior or the language of the body, "but the economy, the efficiency of movements, their internal organization" (p. 137)
disciplines as "general formulas of domination"
The art of distributions
1. Discipline sometimes requires enclosure
2. Disciplinary machinery works space in a flexible and detailed way
3. Functional sites code space
4. Rank matters -- the place one occupies in classification (p. 145)
"Discipline is an art of rank, a technique for the transformation of arrangements. It individualizes bodies by a location that does not give them a fixed position, but distributes them and circulates them in a network of relations" (p. 146)
The ideal: maximum speed and maximum efficiency (p. 154)
Disciplinary time (p. 159) imposed on pedagogical practice -- when exams must be given and when students must be at a particular stage
"the ultimate capacity of an individual" -- to be useful "according to the level in the series that they are moving through" (p. 160)
the macro- and a micro-physics of power
"Thus a new demand appears to which discipline must respond: to construct a machine whose effect will be maximized by the concerted articulation of the elementary parts of which it is composed. Discipline is no longer simply as art of distributing bodies, of extracting time from them and accumulating it, but of composing forces in order to obtain an efficient machine" (p. 164)
"The individual body becomes an element that may be placed, moved, articulated on others."
Individuality: cellular, organic, genetic, and combinatory (p. 167)
Creates 'tactics' -- "the art of constructing, with located bodies, coded activities and trained aptitudes, mechanisms in which the product of the various forces is increased by their calculated combination are no doubt the highest form of disciplinary practice" (p. 167)
The means of correct training
"Instead of bending all its subjects into a single uniform mass, it separates, analyses, differentiates, carries its procedures of decomposition to the point of necessary and sufficient single units" (p. 170) -- where is teacher collaboration?
"Discipline 'makes' individuals; it is the specific technique of a power that regards individuals as both objects and as instruments of its exercise" (p. 170)
Coerces by means of observation -- hierarchized surveillance
Who ends up in this particular classroom?
"Discipline makes possible the operation of a relational power that sustains itself by its own mechanism and which, for the spectacle of public events, subsitutes the uninterrupted play of calculated gazes" (p. 177) -- a subtle power
A double system: "gratification-punishment" (p. 180)
"the disciplinary apparatuses hierarchized the 'good' and the 'bad' subjects in relation to one another" (p. 181) "Through this micro-economy of a perpetual penality operates a differentiation that is not one of acts, but of individuals themselves, of their nature, their potentialities, their level or their value."
"This distribution according to ranks or grade has a double role: it marks the gaps, hierarchizes qualities, skills and aptitudes; but it also punishes and rewards" (p. 181)
"a constant pressure to conform" (p. 182)
the regime of disciplinary power: 5 operations (p. 182) -- "In short, it normalizes" (pp. 183-84)
"It is not simply at the level of consciousness, of representation and in what one thinks one knows, but at the level of what makes possible the knowledge that is transformed into political investment" (p. 185) Discipline makes determines what is even knowable -- the power/knowledge crux
Examination and discipline "fix" individuals into places (p. 189) -- "formalization of the individual within power relations" (p. 190)
The "case" (p. 191)
Normalizing through comparison -- normal and abnormal
KEY: "In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production" (p. 194)
Panopticism
"the penetration of regulation into the smallest details of everyday life" (p. 198) -- "capillary function of power"
useful wherever a "particular form of behavior must be imposed" (p. 205)
exercise of power supervised by society as a whole
discipline mechanism -- power moves rapidly and lightly -- "the design of a subtle coercion for a society to come" (p. 209)
"discipline fixes; it arrests or regulates movements; it clears up confusion; it dissipates compact groupings of individuals wandering about the country in unpredictable ways; it establishes calculated distributions" (p. 219)
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